The safety monitoring system in an underground mine consists of mainly methane sensors and smoke sensors. 
Introduction
Reliability practices began in the late 1940's. With rapid development of technologies in electronics, components and systems have become increasingly complex and reliability has been given more considerable attention by both researchers and practitioners. From the viewpoint of engineering, reliability engineering deals with measures to extend a component or system's life by reducing its potential failure modes.
Many systems use redundancy to achieve their intended reliability A common form of redundancy is a k-out-of-n:F system in which at least k out of n components must be failed for the system to fail. In practice, some systems consist of two subsystems which have a k-out-of-n:F structure individually. One example is the monitoring sensor group and controller subsystem applied in underground coal mines. It should be noted that existing results for the single k-out-of-n:F system cannot directly provide an optimal solution for this kind of subsystem structure. In this paper, a new model for this problem will be presented, which is called two kout-of-n:F subsystems connected in series.
Review of k-out-of-n Systems
A common form of redundancy in fault-tolerant systems is known as the k-out-of-n system, introduced by Birnbaum et al. [2] in 1961. In such a k-out-of-n system, both the system and its components have only two states: working (good) or failed. The term k-out-of-n system usually indicates a k-out-of-n:G system, a k-outof-n:F system, or both.
Many types of systems consist of components that can fail in two mutually exclusive modes; correspondingly, the system can fail in either of two mutually exclusive ways. We call it a k-out-of-n:F system with two failure modes. The probability of a system failing in closed mode is denoted as F s (k, n) [6] :
and the probability of a system failing in open mode is denoted as F o (k, n) [6] :
where, q s is the probability of each component failing in closed mode (p s = 1 − q s ), and q o is the probability of each component failing in open mode (p o = 1 − q o ) when the components are all independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). System reliability is denoted as R(k, n):
and the average system cost is denoted as T (k, n):
where, c 0 is the cost of each component, c 1 is the cost when system failure is in closed mode, and c 2 is the cost when system failure is in open mode. Studies of k-out-of-n systems with two failure modes began in the 1960's [4] , and attracted the interest of researchers in subsequent years on how to optimize the system structure to achieve maximum system reliability and minimum system average cost. Some authors devoted to mathematically optimizing system structure using various constraints: Phillips [9] proved that the k-out-of-n system is preferable for maximizing the reliability of the system with i.i.d. components subject to two failure modes for all values of n; Ben-Dov [1] derived the optimal k value that maximizes system reliability for a fixed n; Sah and Stiglitz [10] derived several properties of k-out-of-n systems and determined the optimal value of k that maximizes the mean system profit for a given n; Pham [5] derived the optimal n value that maximizes system reliability for a fixed k; Pham and Pham [8] determined the optimal k and n values for maximizing system profit; Pham and Malon [7] determined the optimal k and n values for minimizing system cost.
The above authors did great work on the two-failure mode problem of single k-out-of-n systems; however, their results cannot be applied directly to a model that consists of two k-out-of-n:F subsystems with multifailure modes. An application can be found in underground coal mine monitoring systems.
Underground Coal Mine Monitoring Systems
In underground mining, work safety and productivity are correlated closely with environmental quality and equipment operating conditions. Due to the harsh working conditions in underground coal mines, monitoring and detection of mine fires and other environmental variables like the hazardous and explosive gases are significant concerns in mine production safety.
Consider a monitoring sensor group and controller subsystem shown in Figure 1 . Assuming the outstation (controller), power supply, alarm box, and relay box have 100% reliability, the subsystem can be simplified to the general model, which consists of n 1 i.i.d. methane sensors, denoted as S 1 , S 2 , ..., S n1 , and n 2 i.i.d. smoke sensors, denoted as X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n2 . Methane sensors can fail in two ways: by reporting a reading over the threshold while the real methane content has not reached the power breaking point (mode 1), or by failing to detect methane content that has already reached the power breaking point (mode 2). Smoke sensors have similar failure modes (mode 3 and mode 4).
Since each failure mode can cause the loss of production or damage of equipment, problems regarding this kind of subsystem are important. The effect of redundancy on system reliability and average system cost are matters of concern to all involved. So this paper, we will discuss the optimal design for the model of two k-out-of-n:F subsystems connected in series with four failure modes. 
Two k-out-of-n Subsystems Connected in Series
Since we have studied reliability problems in the underground coal mine monitoring system and built up a simplified model for its crucial subsystem, now, we will provide an optimal design for two k-out-of-n:F subsystems connected in series with four failure modes, and determine:
• the optimal values of k * 1 , k * 2 that maximize system reliability and minimize average system cost, for fixed n 1 , n 2 ;
• the optimal values of n * 1 , n * 2 that maximize system reliability and minimize average system cost, for fixed k 1 , k 2 under the constraint n 1 + n 2 ≤ n.
The following assumption and notation are used in this study:
Assumption:
• The subsystems consist of n 1 + n 2 sensors that are statistically independent, where n 1 and n 2 are two groups of sensors and identical respectively.
• Each sensor can be either good (accurate) or failed (error exceeds toleration or the sensor is completely unable to work).
• The system can be: good (it sends correct commands) or failed in mode 1, 2, 3, or 4, respectively.
• The failures of the two types of sensors are independent.
• The constraint is: 
Notation:
• q 11 : probability of a sensor (group 1)'s failure in mode 1 (p 11 = 1 − q 11 ) • q 12 : probability of a sensor (group 1)'s failure in mode 2 (p 12 = 1 − q 12 ) • q 21 : probability of a sensor (group 2)'s failure in mode 3 (p 21 = 1 − q 21 ) • q 22 : probability of a sensor (group 2)'s failure in mode 4 (p 22 = 1 − q 22 ) • F 11 : probability that the system fails in mode 1
• F 12 : probability that the system fails in mode 2
• F 21 : probability that the system fails in mode 3
• F 22 : probability that the system fails in mode 4
• F 1 : failure probability of the menthane sensor subsystem (F 1 = F 11 + F 12 ) • F 2 : failure probability of the smoke sensor subsystem (F 2 = F 21 + F 22 ) • R 1 : reliability of the menthane sensor subsystem
• R 2 : reliability of the smoke sensor subsystem
• F s : system's failure probability
• c 11 : loss when system fails in mode 1
• c 12 : loss when system fails in mode 2
• c 21 : loss when system fails in mode 3
• c 22 : loss when system fails in mode 4
• d 1 : the cost of each sensor from group 1
• d 2 : the cost of each sensor from group 2
Maximizing system reliability
Consider the simplified model illustrated in Figure  1 .The system fails in mode 1 if and only if at least k 1 of its n 1 methane sensors from group 1 fail in mode 1. We obtain the probability that the system fails in mode 1, denoted as F 11 (k 1 , n 1 ):
The system fails in mode 2 if and only if at least n 1 − k 1 + 1 of its n 1 methane sensors from group 1 fail in mode 2. We obtain the probability that the system fails in mode 2, denoted as F 12 (k 1 , n 1 ):
It can also be shown that:
Then, the system's reliability is expressed as:
This means that we have two k-out-of-n:F subsystems connected in series. Define,
Then, the system reliability in equation (9) can be written as:
Theorem 1: Fixing n 1 , n 2 , q 11 , q 12 , q 21 , q 22 , where n 1 + n 2 ≤ n, the optimal value of k 1 , k 2 for maximizing system reliability,
where 
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Duan [3] .
Example 1 Given n 1 = 14, n 2 = 6, q 11 = 0.03, q 12 = 0.08, q 21 = 0.06, q 22 = 0.04, by equations (12) From this example we can find that though the failure probability of methane sensors and smoke sensors at each mode are not very low, the system reliability can still reach 0.9987 by setting optimal k 1 , k 2 value, which proves that setting optimal redundancy can greatly improve the system reliability in two k-out-of-n:F subsystems connected in series.
Theorem 2: Fixing k 1 , k 2 , q 11 , q 12 , q 21 , q 22 , the optimal values of n 1 , n 2 that maximize the system reliability, R(n 1 , n 2 ), say n * 1 , n * 2 can be obtained at,
where
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Duan [3] .
Example 2 Given k 1 = 7, k 2 = 8, q 11 = 0.17, q 12 = 0.15, q 21 = 0.10, q 22 = 0.20, by equations (15) and (16), we obtain n 01 = 13.585, n 02 = 19.060, then, n (10), we see that R max = 0.9957. Again, by applying the simple recursive algorithm, we can get the same results.
A problem is that the optimal value n * 1 and n * 2 given by equation (15) and (16) are derived without considering the constraint n 1 + n 2 ≤ n. In practice, we can also compute such n * 1 , n * 2 , then see whether they satisfy the constraint or not. If n * 1 + n * 2 > n, either n * 1 or n * 2 or both must be decreased until they have satisfied the constraint.
Minimizing the average system cost
From last section, we can conclude that as the reliability of two k-out-of-n:F subsystems connected in series increases, the average system cost increases as a result of using more redundant sensors. In practise, designers must consider the economic issues as well as the improvement of reliability. Thus, our concern is how to derive a cost-effective solution that achieves a balance between reliability and cost.
To simplify the problem, we assume that the failures of two types of sensors are independent and mutually exclusive, that is:
This assumption makes sense when F 1 and F 2 are small. Define the total system cost T (k 1 , n 1 , k 2 , n 2 ):
The objective function (17) is the cost of all sensors in the subsystem, plus the expected cost of subsystem failure in mode 1 (c 11 F 11 (k 1 , n 1 )), mode 2 (c 12 F 12 (k 1 , n 1 )), mode 3 (c 21 F 21 (k 2 , n 2 )), and mode 4 (c 22 F 22 (k 2 , n 2 )). We also have the constraint of n 1 + n 2 ≤ n. Fixing n 1 , n 2 , q 11 , q 12 , q 21 , q 22 , d 1 ,  d 2 , c 11 , c 12 , c 21 and c 22 , where n 1 + n 2 ≤ n, the optimal values of k 1 , k 2 that minimize total system cost, 
Theorem 3:
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Duan [3] . Then we try to obtain n * 1 , n * 2 as k 1 , k 2 are given. For two k-out-of-n:F subsystems connected in series with four failure modes, when k 1 , k 2 are given, there are two variables, n 1 , n 2 , in the total system cost equation (17) . If the constraint of n 1 + n 2 ≤ n is considered, n 1 and n 2 are dependent; if the constraint is ignored, n 1 and n 2 are independent.
To simplify the problem, first, we ignore the constraint, n 1 + n 2 ≤ n, so n 1 and n 2 are independent in the objective function (17). , then, 
